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SITUATIONIST CHALLENGE 
TO VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY’ 
 
 
 
Duncan Pritchard 
University of Edinburgh 
 
ABSTRACT. The situationist challenge to virtue theory has recently been extended so that it 
applies not just to virtue ethics but also to virtue epistemology. Focussing on the most 
developed version of the situationist challenge to virtue epistemology⎯offered in recent 
work by Mark Alfano, and applied in different ways to responsibilist and reliabilist virtue 
epistemology⎯it is argued that this critique of virtue epistemology is ultimately unsuccessful. 
In particular, it is claimed that the crucial distinction that needs to be marked is not between 
responsibilist and reliabilist renderings of virtue epistemology, but rather between modest and 
robust construals of this position. It is shown that the situationist challenge to virtue 
epistemology at best only impacts on robust virtue epistemology, but since robust virtue 
epistemology can be shown on independent grounds to be untenable this is not in itself a 
cause for concern. Moreover, not only is the empirical data appealed to by Alfano in his 
situationist critique of virtue epistemology compatible with the more plausible modest 
rendering of virtue epistemology, but it actually lends additional support to the view over its 
robust counterpart. It is thus concluded that virtue epistemology, at least when properly 
understood, has nothing to fear from the empirical data offered by situationists against virtue 
theory. 
 
 
1. THE SITUATIONIST CHALLENGE TO VIRTUE THEORY 
 
The situationist challenge to virtue theory initially arose with respect to virtue ethics. In broad terms, 
virtue ethicists treat the character traits of the agent⎯specifically, her moral virtues⎯as 
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fundamental to their ethical theory. The morally good person is the morally virtuous person, where 
this means an agent possessing the moral virtues and who thus acts appropriately across a range of 
different situations where morally relevant action is called for. So, for example, the good person will 
characteristically respond to seeing a person in need by helping them, where their good actions arise 
out of their recognition that the person is in need and that they ought to help them.  
 In this way, virtue ethicists make essential appeal to stable character traits (i.e., virtues) in 
setting out their view. It is precisely this element of the proposal that situationists object to, in that 
they claim that findings from recent studies in empirical psychology demonstrate that agents do not 
in general possess such character traits, and instead mostly act in response to particular features of 
the situation in hand. Here, for example, is Gilbert Harman’s summary of the situationist thesis: 
 
We very confidently attribute character traits to other people in order to explain their behaviour. But 
out attributions tend to be wildly incorrect and, in fact, there is no evidence that people differ in their 
character traits. They differ in their situations and in their perceptions of their situations. They differ 
in their goals, strategies, neuroses, optimism, etc. But character traits do not explain what differences 
there are. (Harman 1998-99, §8) 
 
The studies which putatively support this claim are extensive. They demonstrate that how a subject 
responds to a situation is in fact highly sensitive to features of the situation (or perceived features of 
the situation), including features of the situation of which they may be consciously unaware. Such 
influencing situational factors include such things as ambient odours and sounds, weather 
conditions, and the presence of bystanders, to list just three. Situationists therefore claim that what 
explains a subject’s actions is not their character (where this involves stable character traits of a 
virtue-theoretic kind), or not normally their character anyway, but rather how they are responding to 
the particular situation in hand.1   
 Insofar as one grants that these studies do indeed generate this conclusion, then it follows that 
virtue ethicists are at the very least required to give up on the idea that their view has general 
application to the folk at large. That is, that while perhaps some particularly sophisticated people out 
there have the kind of character traits that virtue ethicists postulate, this is not true of most people. 
Given that virtue ethics is meant to be a proposal with general application, this would be a 
potentially disastrous consequence for the view. 
 Of course, as one would expect, virtue ethicists have disputed that these studies do have this 
disastrous consequence. For example, one main line of counterattack has been to claim that such 
studies mistakenly equate the behaviour manifested by the agents concerned with the kind of 
character-driven behaviour that virtue ethicists are concerned with.2 
 
	  
3 
 My interest here is not, however, with the challenge posed by situationism to virtue ethics, but 
rather a putative extension of that challenge to virtue epistemology. On the face of it, whatever 
challenge that one makes to the former ought to straightforwardly carry over to the latter. After all, 
since both proposals are forms of virtue theory which hence make essential appeal to the character 
traits of the agent (whether they be moral or intellectual virtues), then any situationist attack on 
appeals to character in virtue ethics seem to be prima facie just as applicable to virtue epistemology. 
As we will see, on closer inspection this point is far from clear.  
 
 
2. SITUATIONISM CONTRA VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
The clearest expression of the situationist challenge to virtue epistemology in the current literature is 
offered by Mark Alfano (2012; 2013, part II; forthcoming), and so I will focus my attention on his 
presentation of the problem.3 It is standard practice in the epistemological literature to distinguish 
between two main types of virtue epistemology⎯responsibilist virtue epistemology and reliabilist virtue 
epistemology⎯and rather than offering a generic situationist challenge to virtue epistemology, 
Alfano instead targets these two types of virtue epistemology separately.4 There is a very good 
reason for this, since it is only responsibilist virtue epistemology which conceives of knowledge as 
being the product of intellectual character traits which are relevantly akin to the moral character 
traits employed by virtue ethics. That is, for responsibilist virtue epistemology knowledge is the 
product of intellectual virtues which, like moral virtues, are “motivational and reasons-responsive 
dispositions to act and react in characteristic ways (e.g., open-mindedness, curiosity, intellectual 
courage, etc.).” (Alfano 2012, 224) As such, the situationist critique of virtue ethics ought to directly 
carry over to responsibilist virtue epistemology. In contrast, reliabilist virtue epistemology treats 
knowledge as being (typically) produced by “non-motivational capacities, dispositions, or process 
that tend to lead their possessors to increase the balance of truths over falsehoods in their belief sets 
(e.g., sound deduction, good eyesight, capacious memory, etc.).” (Alfano 2012, 223-4) Given the 
very different way in which reliabilist virtue epistemology appeals to character traits, it is far from 
obvious that the situationist critique of virtue ethics should have application here, as Alfano 
recognises.5 
 Let’s start with Alfano’s situationist attack on responsibility virtue epistemology. Alfano’s 
strategy is to cite experiments which appear to show that situational factors have a significant 
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bearing on agents’ abilities to complete certain intellectual tasks. For example, he cites the ‘Duncker 
candle task’.6 This task is a test of one’s intellectual flexibility and creativity, and it demonstrates a 
particular cognitive bias that agents are subject to, known as functional fixedness. The problem that 
subjects are asked to solve is how to fix a candle to a vertical cork board so that no wax drips. The 
items offered to the subjects are the candle, a box of tacks and a book of matches. The solution to 
the puzzle is to empty the box of tacks and use that as a candle holder, but subjects often struggle to 
recognise this. The problem is that they are thinking of the box as merely a container for the tacks, 
and not seeing that it can have other uses⎯that is, they are fixating on the particular function of the 
box as it is presented to them, and failing to see that the box can perform other functions. In 
contrast, if subjects are presented with the very same items for performing this task, but with the 
tacks already removed from the box, then they tend to very quickly recognise that the box can be 
used to solve the problem in hand.  
 The manner in which materials are presented to an agent can thus have a significant bearing 
on that agent’s ability to perform a problem-solving task, even though this is intuitively an entirely 
epistemically irrelevant factor. Alfano further argues that this is not an isolated phenomenon, in that 
it is possible to manipulate all kinds of situational factors which are intuitively epistemically 
irrelevant⎯such as raising a subject’s mood by giving them candy before asking them to perform a 
task⎯in such a way as to significantly impact on the subject’s ability to perform the task.7 The 
conclusion that Alfano draws is that this shows that when subjects are successful in these tasks, the 
success is not the product of the subject’s exercise of intellectual virtue, as responsibilist virtue 
epistemologists suggest, but rather due to their responsiveness to these, apparently epistemically 
irrelevant, situational factors. 
 Alfano’s attack on reliabilist virtue epistemology is more targeted than his critique of 
responsibility virtue epistemology. Indeed, Alfano explicitly grants that reliabilist virtue epistemology 
is not obviously troubled by the situationist critique when it comes to specifically non-inferential 
knowledge, since he grants that the processes in play in this regard (perception, memory, and so on), 
are generally reliable.8 Alfano’s focus is thus on the reliabilist virtue epistemic account of inferential 
knowledge. His claim is that such an account founders for the simple reason that “our usual 
methods of inference […] are astonishingly unreliable.” (Alfano forthcoming, 15-16)    
 The empirical case that Alfano mounts in support of this claim appeals to the well-known 
examples of cognitive bias developed in various studies conducted since the 1970s by Amos Tversky 
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and Daniel Kahneman.9 Perhaps the most famous of their cases is the ‘Linda’ example (Tversky & 
Kahneman 2002), which is also employed by Alfano as part of his situationist critique of reliabilist 
virtue epistemology (Alfano forthcoming, §4). In this experiment, subjects are given some information 
about a person, Linda, such as that she is single and outspoken, very bright, deeply concerned about 
social justice, and part of the anti-nuclear movement. The subjects are then asked to rate the degree 
to which Linda is representative of a certain class of people, such as feminists, bank tellers, or 
feminist bank tellers. Subjects will typically respond by stating that Linda is more representative of 
feminists than she is of feminist bank tellers, and will therefore judge that it’s more likely that Linda 
is a feminist than that she is a feminist bank teller. But, of course, it cannot be more likely that a 
conjunction obtains than that one of its conjuncts obtains (to think otherwise is to fall foul of the 
conjunction fallacy), and so it cannot be more likely that Linda is a feminist than that she is a 
feminist and a bank teller. The point of the example is to show that subjects are employing a 
particular heuristic in their reasoning⎯the so-called ‘representativeness heuristic’⎯but that this 
causes them to engage in fallacious reasoning. 
 Alfano argues that since cognitive bias of this sort is widespread in our inferential judgements, 
so the reliabilist virtue epistemic account of knowledge is in doubt. In particular, Alfano argues that 
the belief-forming processes actually employed by agents when making inferences are not the kind 
of reliable cognitive abilities described by reliabilist virtue theory, but in fact heuristics which are not 
generally reliable at all. The upshot is that reliabilist virtue epistemology is incompatible with the idea 
that we have the kind of widespread inferential knowledge that we ascribe to ourselves. 
 One way of responding to Alfano’s situationist critique of virtue epistemology could be to bite 
the bullet and grant that we have far less knowledge than we typically suppose. When it comes to the 
cognitive bias cases in particular, this route strikes me as fairly plausible, in that one could imagine a 
reliabilist virtue epistemology simply conceding that the upshot of this empirical work is that 
inferential knowledge is must harder to attain across a range of cases than we hitherto imagined. For 
now, however, I will setting this dialectical option to one side (we will return to it later).  
 A second way of responding to Alfano’s critique of virtue epistemology might be to dispute 
the empirical data on which it depends, or at least argue against the particular conclusions that 
Alfano is deriving from this data. I have some sympathy with this style of response too, since it is 
not clear to me either that we should take these experimental results at face value as Alfano does, or 
that they pose the general challenge to virtue epistemology that Alfano imagines.10 Nonetheless, I 
will not be responding to the situationist critique of virtue epistemology in this way. Instead, I will 
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be arguing that once virtue epistemology is understood correctly, it is in fact entirely compatible with 
the empirical studies that Alfano cites.  
  
 
3. MODEST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
AND THE SITUATIONIST CRITIQUE 
 
In the last section we saw that Alfano offers a different version of the situationist critique of virtue 
epistemology depending on whether it is responsibilist or reliabilist virtue epistemology that is at 
issue. But there is another way of classifying virtue-theoretic proposals in epistemology which is of 
far more relevance to the situationist challenge, one which cuts across the responsibilist/reliabilist 
distinction. This is the distinction between modest and robust virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge. 
According to the former, it is merely a necessary condition for knowledge that the cognitive success 
in question be the product of (depending on the form of virtue epistemology in play) a cognitive 
ability or intellectual virtue. According to the latter, in contrast, knowledge is to be exclusively 
defined in terms of cognitive success which is appropriately related to cognitive ability/intellectual 
virtue.11  
 If virtue epistemology, of either a reliabilist or responsibility variety, is construed along robust 
lines, then Alfano’s situationist critique will have some bite. Crucially, however, virtue epistemology 
is only ever plausible when construed along modest lines.  
 In order to see this point, let us briefly consider a version of robust virtue epistemology which 
has been offered by John Greco (2003; 2007; 2008; 2009a; 2009b), and which is broadly speaking a 
reliabilist proposal (albeit one with some responsibilist elements to it). According to Greco, 
knowledge is, roughly, cognitive success (i.e., true belief) that is because of one’s cognitive ability, 
where this means that the cognitive success in question is primarily creditable to the exercise of 
one’s cognitive ability.12 So, for example, the agent in a standard Gettier-style case lacks knowledge 
on this proposal because while he is cognitively successful and has manifested cognitive ability in 
forming his true belief, his cognitive success is not primarily creditable to the exercise of his 
cognitive ability but rather due to the epistemic luck that is in play.  
 Robust virtue epistemology is certainly posed a prima facie threat by the situationist challenge. 
On both a responsibilist and reliabilist rendering, the worry will be that in a wide range of cases what 
primarily explains the agent’s cognitive success is not her exercise of her cognitive abilities but rather 
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other factors outwith her cognitive agency, such as situational factors. 
 The problem with robust virtue epistemology, however, is that it is independently implausible, 
and so the fact that it may be subject to the situationist challenge is ultimately neither here nor there. 
In particular, the proposal is implausible in that it is both too strong and too weak.13 It is too strong 
because in epistemically friendly conditions agents can acquire knowledge even though their 
cognitive success is not primarily creditable to the exercise of their cognitive ability/intellectual 
virtue. In testimonial cases, for example, subjects can (on standard accounts of the epistemology of 
testimony at any rate) come to acquire testimonial knowledge in epistemically friendly conditions by 
for the most part trusting the word of a knowledgeable informant. But we would not say in such 
cases that the subject’s cognitive success is primarily creditable to her cognitive agency, as opposed 
to the cognitive agency of the informant. 
 Robust virtue epistemology is also too weak in that in epistemically unfriendly conditions even 
a cognitive success that is primarily creditable to the agent’s exercise of their cognitive 
ability/intellectual virtue will not suffice for knowledge. In ‘barn façade’-style cases, for example, an 
agent’s cognitive success (e.g., at identifying the target barn) is no less attributable to their cognitive 
agency than it is in parallel cases where there are no façades in the vicinity. And yet the presence of 
the façades in the vicinity ensures that this is a lucky, and thus Gettierized, cognitive success, in that 
it is a cognitive success that could so very easily have been failure.14  
 The point is that knowledge exhibits what I have elsewhere called an epistemic dependence on 
factors outwith the cognitive agency of the subject, where this epistemic dependency has both a 
positive and negative aspect.15 It is positive when an agent exhibits a relatively low degree of 
cognitive agency, and yet qualifies as having knowledge nonetheless due to factors outwith her 
cognitive agency, such as epistemically friendly features of the environment (e.g., the kind of features 
that obtain in the testimonial case just considered). And it is negative when an agent exhibits a high 
degree of cognitive agency⎯such that they would ordinarily count as having knowledge⎯and yet 
they lack knowledge nonetheless due to factors outwith their cognitive agency, such as epistemically 
unfriendly features of the environment (e.g., the kind of features that obtain in the barn façade case 
just considered).  
 Once one recognises the epistemic dependency of knowledge, then robust virtue epistemology 
ceases to be an option. Modest virtue epistemology, in contrast, is entirely compatible with the 
epistemic dependence of knowledge, since it merely claims that one’s knowledge should be the 
product of cognitive ability/intellectual virtue, thereby allowing that there can be other conditions 
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on knowledge over and above the epistemic virtue condition. Is modest virtue epistemology 
susceptible to the situationist critique? 
 In order to evaluate this issue we need to return to the situationist challenge and identify 
exactly what it purports to show. In particular, in order for the situationist challenge to impact even 
on modest virtue epistemology it needs to demonstrate that in a wide range of cases not just that the 
agent’s cognitive success, where it occurs, is not primarily creditable to her exercise of her cognitive 
abilities/intellectual virtues, but moreover that the agent’s cognitive success is not in any significant way 
the product of her cognitive abilities/intellectual virtues. Do the cases offered by the situationist 
establish this stronger claim? 
 I suggest not. Take first the kind of case which Alfano presents against responsibilist virtue 
epistemology, such as the Duncker candle test. One immediate moral of such examples is that we 
should lower our confidence in our problem-solving abilities, given that they have been empirically 
shown to be less effective than we might have hitherto supposed. This is a kind of mitigated 
scepticism, but it is not yet the full-blown scepticism which Alfano imagines as being one route out 
of this problem for the responsibilist virtue epistemology. In order to get the more full-blown 
scepticism we need to move from considering cases where cognitive bias⎯in this case functional 
fixedness⎯stands in the way of cognitive success, and consider parallel cases where, due to purely 
situational factors, the agent is cognitive successful. That is, Alfano’s claim must be that since it is 
just situational factors (including their absence) which often make the difference between cognitive 
success and cognitive failure, so even in cases of cognitive success we should not attribute this 
cognitive success to the subject’s epistemic virtue (conceived along responsibilist lines), but to the 
situational factors. The scepticism thus extends out from the ‘bad’ cases where cognitive bias stands 
in the way of cognitive success, and infects even the ‘good’ cases where the subject is cognitive 
successful.  
 With this point in mind, imagine now that the Duncker problem is posed for the subject in a 
way that ensures that she does not fall foul of functional fixedness, and so easily solves the problem. 
That the situation has been set up to ensure success makes trouble for the idea that we should 
regard her cognitive success as primarily creditable to her cognitive agency, and so there is a prima 
facie tension between this empirical data, so described anyway, and robust virtue epistemology. That 
is, we should grant to Alfano that the fact that a mere change in situational factors can mark the 
difference between cognitive success and cognitive failure indicates that it is at least problematic to 
suppose that it is the subject’s cognitive agency which is the overarching explanation for her 
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cognitive success.  
 But once we move from robust virtue epistemology to modest virtue epistemology, even when 
cast along responsibilist lines, even this prima facie tension disappears. For sure, features of the 
situation are playing an explanatory role in the subject’s cognitive success; that much is not in 
question. But surely the subject’s cognitive abilities are also playing a significant role too (albeit one 
in concert with the situational factors)? If one holds that knowledge is simply a function of cognitive 
agency, in line with robust virtue epistemology, then there is a potential problem with situational 
factors having this influence on the subject’s cognitive success. But if one explicitly grants, with 
modest virtue epistemology, that there is an epistemic dependence to knowledge acquisition, such 
that it isn’t merely a function of cognitive agency, then one can allow that the acquisition of 
knowledge might well be dependent upon such extra-agential situational factors and yet be bona fide 
nonetheless. What counts is only that a significant degree of cognitive agency is on display. In the 
right circumstances⎯i.e., where the environment is effectively primed for success, as it is in the case 
where the situational circumstances are propitious⎯even quite a limited degree of cognitive agency 
can suffice for knowledge. Far from showing that modest virtue epistemology is untenable, such 
cases appear to offer empirical support for the view over its robust counterpart. 
 The same is true even if we turn to the cognitive biases that Alfano cites against reliabilist 
virtue epistemology. As before, we need to recognise from the outset that such cases offer by 
everyone’s lights a basis for endorsing a mitigated scepticism about inferential knowledge. If 
cognitive bias is rife in our reasoning, then we should be less confident that we can gain knowledge 
via such reasoning. In order for this mitigated scepticism to translate into a more full-blown 
scepticism, however, it needs to be the case that even where agents are not subject to cognitive bias 
they nonetheless lack knowledge.  
 It is clear in the case of responsibilist virtue epistemology that Alfano thinks the move from 
the mitigated scepticism to the more full-blown scepticism is motivated by the fact that merely 
situational (and thus epistemically irrelevant) factors mark the difference between cases of cognitive 
failure due to cognitive bias and parallel cases of cognitive success where cognitive bias does not 
lead to cognitive failure. It is not so clear what the corresponding ‘bridging’ claim in his argument is 
when it comes to reliabilist virtue epistemology, but I take it the thought must be that since there is 
nothing in a normal agents’ reasoning practices which differentiates between the reasoning which 
involves cognitive bias and that which is free from cognitive bias, so all inferential knowledge is 
called into question by the phenomenon of widespread cognitive bias. 
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 The problem with this kind of bridging claim, however, is that it is susceptible to the very 
same kind of response which we just saw levelled at Alfano’s critique of responsibilist virtue 
epistemology. If the reliability of one’s reasoning is not responsive to the presence of cognitive bias, 
then when one’s reasoning is successful one’s cognitive success can hardly be primary creditable to 
one’s cognitive agency. This much seems undeniable. But this is only a problem for a robust virtue 
epistemology which does not allow for the epistemic dependency of knowledge. For the modest 
(reliabilist) virtue epistemologist, in contrast, that one’s cognitive success, while being significantly 
creditable to one’s cognitive agency, might be in addition creditable to other factors, such as that one 
is presented with information in such a way as not to trigger a cognitive bias, is not in itself a 
problem for the view.16 
 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Whether the situational critique extends to virtue epistemology depends, I have argued, less on 
whether one opts for a responsibilist or reliabilist rendering of this thesis, and more on the kind of 
virtue epistemology one wishes to advance. In particular, it is only if one offers a robust virtue 
epistemology which bravely attempts to make knowledge a function of cognitive agency that the 
empirical data the situationist offers against virtue epistemology presents even the prima facie 
challenge that that Alfano imagines. Once we move to a modest virtue epistemology⎯a dialectical 
shift which I have claimed is motivated on independent grounds⎯there is not even the prima facie 
tension with the situationist’s empirical data. The reason for this is that a modest virtue epistemology 
explicitly embraces the phenomenon of the epistemic dependence of knowledge, and so can allow 
that factors outwith cognitive agency can have a significant role to play in the acquisition of 
knowledge. Indeed, it turns out that not does the empirical data offered by situationism not pose a 
challenge to virtue epistemology, properly conceived, but that it effectively offers empirical support 
for the particular brand of virtue epistemology that most proponents of the view recognise to be the 
most compelling version of the thesis. Properly conceived, then, virtue epistemology has nothing to 
fear from the situationist critique.17 
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NOTES 
	  
1  For an excellent overview of the relevant empirical literature, see Doris (2002). See also Prinz (2009). For a 
comprehensive and up-to-date bibliographical survey of the literature on situationism and virtue theory (including both 
empirical and philosophical literature, and covering both historical and contemporary sources), see Alfano & 
Fairweather (forthcoming).  
2  See, for example, Merritt (2000) and Sreenivasan (2002). For an interesting variation on this kind of response to 
situationism, see Sosa (2009b).  
3  See also Doris & Olin (forthcoming) for a critique of virtue epistemology which runs along the same lines as that found 
in Alfano (2012; 2013, part II; forthcoming). Although the literature on situationism as it applies to virtue epistemology is 
currently still nascent, there are a few useful works available. See, for example, Axtell (2010), Baehr (2011, passim), and 
Hazlett (2013, passim). See also Fairweather & Montemayor (forthcoming), which is a response to Alfano (2012), and 
Pritchard (forthcomingb).  
4  For an excellent overview of contemporary virtue epistemology which marks this distinction particularly well, see 
Axtell (1997). 
5  For an example of a reliabilist virtue-theoretic proposal, see the agent reliabilist position defended in early work by 
Greco (1999; 2000). For a very different neo-Aristotelian virtue-theoretic proposal which incorporates responsibilist 
elements, see Zagzebski (1996). 
6  See Duncker (1945), cited in Alfano (2012, 235). 
7  See Doris & Olin (forthcoming) for a fairly comprehensive overview of the relevant empirical literature in this regard. 
8  Though even that could be in dispute. As Doris & Olin (forthcoming, §5) point out, for example, the reliability of one’s 
vision can be dependent upon such apparently irrelevant factors as whether the visual scene in question is presented to 
the upper-right side of one’s visual field. In order to keep the discussion manageable, in what follows I will be setting 
this concern to one side. 
9  Alfano focuses on Tverksy & Kahneman (1973; 2002).  
10  For example, consider again the Linda case. It has been widely noted in the psychological literature that subjects’ 
judgements about the likelihood of an event are often best understood along counterfactual rather than probabilistic 
lines. (For a survey of some of the relevant psychological literature in this regard, see Pritchard & Smith (2004)). For 
instance, a subject might regard an event which they grant has a very low probability of occurring as being nonetheless 
very risky if they judge that it is the kind of event which could very easily happen to them. Conversely, if subjects judge 
that an event could not very easily happen to them, then they might regard it as not being risky even while 
simultaneously granting that it has a high probability of occurring. The relevance of this point to the Linda case is that 
when subjects judge it to be more likely that Linda is a feminist than that she is a feminist bank teller, they could be 
charitably construed as offering a (correct) counterfactual judgement. That is, given what they know about Linda, that 
she could more easily be a feminist than that she could be a feminist bank teller. So construed the subjects are not 
committing the conjunction fallacy at all. (A broadly similar line of response to the Linda case is offered by Gigerenzer 
(2010, 70-73; cf. Gigerenzer 2007, ch. 6) and discussed in Fairweather & Montemayor (forthcoming, §4)). Note that I’m 
not suggesting that all of the cognitive bias cases can be resolved in this way. The point is rather that once we start to 
examine these cases more carefully, then it’s far from obvious that they pose the general challenge to inferential 
judgements that Alfano supposes, rather than merely showing that we do not have as much inferential knowledge as we 
typically suppose.   
11  I’ve drawn the distinction between robust and modest virtue epistemology⎯or ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ virtue 
epistemology, as I sometimes put it⎯in a number of works. See, for example, Pritchard (2009b, ch. 3; 2012), Pritchard, 
Millar & Haddock (2010, ch. 2), and Kallestrup & Pritchard (2012; 2013; forthcoming). 
12  Broadly similar robust virtue-theoretic proposals can be found in the work of Sosa (1988; 1991; 2007; 2009a) and 
Zagzebski (1996; 1999). Interestingly, in earlier work⎯most notably Greco (1999; 2000)⎯Greco offered what we are 
here describing as a weak virtue epistemology. 
13  I develop this two-pronged critique of robust virtue epistemology in a number of places. See Pritchard (2009a; 2009b, 
ch. 3; 2009c; 2009d; 2012), Pritchard, Millar & Haddock (2010, chs. 2-4), and Kallestrup & Pritchard (2012; 2013; 
forthcoming). 
14  Notice that the point in play here is not one that can be met by relativizing cognitive abilities to environments and 
conditions which are very narrowly conceived, as some have been tempted to do (for example, Greco (2009a, ch. 5) or, 
approaching the issue from a slightly different angle, Fairweather & Montemayor (forthcoming, §7)). For one thing, as 
Doris & Olin (forthcoming, §6) point out, a virtue epistemology cast along these lines will be so far removed from the 
explanatory task that the view is meant to be engaged with as to be self-defeating. For another, and more importantly, 
such a tactic will not in any case work to deal with the problem posed here as one would need to make cognitive abilities 
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narrowly relativized not just to actual environments and conditions but also to one’s modal environment, and on no 
plausible conception of abilities (cognitive or otherwise) are they relativized in this way. For more on this specific point, 
see, for example, Kallestrup & Pritchard (forthcoming).  
15  See, especially, Kallestrup & Pritchard (2013). 
16  I think that this point has important implications for the epistemology of education, since the dominant view in this 
regard is one on which the goal of education is the promotion of knowledge, where knowledge is in turn understood 
along broadly virtue-theoretic lines. (For a useful survey of the literature on the epistemological goals of education, see 
Robertson (2009)). Situationism, as applied to virtue epistemology, is thus potentially in conflict with the leading 
proposals in the epistemology of education. It is thus important to show that virtue epistemology, properly construed, 
can evade the situationist challenge. For more on the situationist challenge as it applies to the epistemology of education, 
see Pritchard (forthcomingb; cf. Pritchard forthcominga, §1).   
17  Thanks to Abrol Fairweather and Allan Hazlett for helpful discussions on related topics. Special thanks to Mark 
Alfano for detailed comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
